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We use unique plant-level data to study the link between the local availability of services and 
the decision of manufacturing firms to source materials from abroad. To guide our empirical 
analysis we develop a monopolistic-competition model of the materials sourcing decisions of 
heterogeneous firms. The model generates predictions about how the intensity of international 
sourcing of materials depends on a firm’s productivity and the availability of local services. 
These predictions are supported by the data. We find evidence that more productive 
manufacturing firms tend to have a higher ratio of imported materials to sales. In addition, we 
find evidence that services grease the wheels of international commerce: A greater availability 
of services across regions, industries and time increases a firm’s foreign sourcing of materials 
relative to sales. Interestingly, this positive impact of local service availability on imports 
especially applies to stand-alone firms that, unlike multinationals, are less likely to rely on 
imported or internally provided services. 
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International sourcing plays a very important role in the production process
within the global economy. As a matter of fact, the growth in intermediate
goods trade is often referred to as a factor that distinguishes the current
wave of globalization from previous ones.1 Just consider the many sources
of inputs for an iPod, sold by the U.S. company Apple. Dedrick et al.(2009)
show that the hard-drive is produced by the Japanese company Toshiba
using aﬃliates based in China. The display module and display driver are
produced in Japan, while some smaller inputs are also supplied from Korea.
The ﬁnal assembly is carried out by a Taiwanese company in a plant in China.
Furthermore, US suppliers provide the video/multimedia processor as well
as the portal player CPU.
Firms’ international sourcing (also referred to as oﬀshoring) decisions and
their implications have been the subject of much recent theoretical and em-
pirical analysis, as summarized by Helpman (2006). What has received less
attention in the economics literature, however, is the role that services play in
organizing and optimizing these sourcing processes. It has been argued that
services such as transportation, insurance, ﬁnancing, etc. grease the wheels
of international commerce in the sense that they play an important role in
facilitating trade. Francois (1990), Deardorﬀ (2001), Jones and Kierzkowski
(1990), as well as Golub et al. (2001) have emphasized how the increased
availability of more diﬀerentiated or more aﬀordable services can, in addi-
tion, make it easier for ﬁrms to exploit the international division of labor,
and to split production into parts that can be made in diﬀerent locations. It
is in the process of fragmentation of production that computer and business
services should be of particular importance.
In this paper we focus speciﬁcally on the role of computer and business
services in the organization of international trade. We study the link between
the availability of those services and trade in intermediate manufacturing
goods. The main contribution of the current paper is thereby to provide
empirical evidence (motivated by a simple heterogeneous ﬁrm type model)
on how this process of greasing the wheels of international commerce works
at the micro level. For this purpose, we focus on imports of materials and
investigate whether the availability of local services induces manufacturing
1See, for instance, Hummels et al. (2001). Yi (2003) has hypothesized that the in-
creased fragmentation of production and the resulting trade in intermediates is an impor-
tant factor behind the growth of international trade.
1ﬁrms to source more material inputs from abroad. Our study relies on ﬁrm-
level data, and we use two features of this data to isolate the eﬀect of services:
(i) information on the variation in service availability across regions, time
and industry, and (ii) information on ﬁrm size, labor productivity and ﬁrm
status as national or multinational ﬁrm that, as we will show, are likely to
be correlated with a ﬁrm’s dependence on local services.2
While the link between services and international sourcing has not re-
ceived much attention in the economics literature so far, the business lit-
erature, for some time now, has emphasized the importance of services for
organizing a ﬁrm’s production.3 Supply-chain management, in particular,
sees the challenge exactly in coordinating and integrating an increasingly
sliced-up-value chain.4 Oﬀ-shoring and outsourcing have matured, it is often
argued, and the main question is no longer whether or not a well-deﬁned part
of production should be produced by an aﬃliate or stand-alone ﬁrm abroad
or at home. Rather, the current focus is on managing and integrating the
whole process of production across its diﬀerent stages from the purchase of
raw materials to the distribution to the customer. It is in this process that
service ﬁrms, and in particular those providing business and computing ser-
vices, have a vital role to play.
Consider, for example, a car producer with an extended supply chain of
hundreds of suppliers. These suppliers send their parts at diﬀerent times,
through diﬀerent channels and in diﬀe r e n tp a c k a g e st ot h ec a rm a n u f a c t u r e r .
Not only is it important that the parts eventually reach the car producer,
there is ample room to optimize this process. The time and arrival of parts
have to be coordinated, damage and losses have to be minimized, interna-
tional customs paperwork has to be taken care of for the pieces coming from
abroad, and parts have to be warehoused before being shipped to the manu-
2Our focus is primarily on the demand for producer services and how it relates to the
production side of the economy, rather than on the demand for consumer services that was
the main focus of the earlier literature on the Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect and the ‘Baumol
disease’. See Francois and Hoekman (2009) for a discussion.
3There is a booming literature that studies ﬁrm heterogeneity and that explores a wide
range of ﬁrm activities relating to ﬁrms’ export and import decisions as well as their
multinational strategies. See Helpman (2006) who surveys work by Antras, Helpman,
Melitz, and others. While this literature has been primarily applied to manufacturing,
there is a growing interest in studying to what extent the models also apply to services,
see Oldenski (2009) and Breinlich and Criscuolo (2009). So far, however, the speciﬁc links
between services and goods trade have received little attention.
4See Gachon and Terwiesch (2009) and Corbett (2004).
2facturer. There are ample opportunities for third-party service providers to
get involved in this process.5 Moreover, many service ﬁrms have extended
their operations into the IT sphere and become increasingly more involved
in the manufacturer’s operations: They can set up a tracking system where
companies can see in real time where their supplies are, and make suggestions
for the optimal bunching of suppliers.
Our analysis has a theoretical and an empirical component. The theoret-
ical component consists of a simple model of the sourcing decisions of het-
erogeneous ﬁrms in the manufacturing sector. This model is used to derive
predictions about how these decisions are aﬀected by ﬁrm characteristics and
the availability of services. In particular, we show how the increased avail-
ability of services should raise the ratio of imported intermediates to sales
especially for ﬁrms that have to rely on local services because they are too
small or ineﬃcient to provide the services themselves or to import them. The
model is related to Raﬀ and Schmitt (2009) who study sourcing decisions of
retail ﬁrms, and to Bas (2008) who studies the eﬀect of trade barriers in in-
put and ﬁnal goods markets on production and exporting decisions. Both of
these papers build on Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). Our model diﬀers from
Antras and Helpman’s (2004) analysis of international sourcing in at least
two important respects. First, we do not consider the question of whether
ﬁrms oﬀ-shore or not but rather how much they oﬀshore. Second, we do
not deal with the question of whether the production of materials is done
in-house or by independent suppliers. Instead we focus on the question of
how ﬁrms procure the services needed for importing materials.
To investigate the empirical relevance of our predictions about the sourc-
ing behavior of ﬁrms, we use an unbalanced panel of Irish plants from the
Annual Business Survey of Economic Impact that runs from 2000 to 2004.
T h ed a t a s e ti sq u i t eu n i q u ei nt h a ti td o c u m e n t st h es o u r c i n gb e h a v i o ri n
great detail, explicitly distinguishing between materials and services as well
as between domestic and international inputs. Note that for Irish ﬁrms do-
mestic and international sourcing are just a fact of life: In our sample, around
90% of manufacturers source some foreign-produced materials and virtually
all manufacturing ﬁrms (94%) source materials in the Irish economy, which
5The business literature sometimes refers to third-party service providers as
third-party logistics ﬁrms. There are ample cases studies of such third-party
logistics ﬁrms, including UPS (http://www.ups-scs.com/solutions) in the United
States, or Accenture in Ireland (“Guide to strategic outsourcing in Ireland”,
http://www.accenture.com/xdoc/ir/locations/ireland/insights/guide.pdf).
3is why we focus on how much is oﬀ-shored, rather than whether there is any
oﬀ-shoring occurring at all.
As far as services go, the Survey focuses on business and computing ser-
vices, which are directly relevant for our study. In the empirical analysis, we
exploit a particular feature of the data to get at the impact of services on the
extent of material imports of ﬁrms. The Annual Survey indicates whether a
plant is located in one of three of Ireland’s relatively diﬀerent regions: the
capital Dublin, the South, and the rest of the country. In our analysis we
investigate how variations in the availability of services across regions, time
and/or industry aﬀect the international sourcing intensity of Irish plants,
speciﬁcally the ratio of oﬀ-shored inputs to sales. Needless to say, we ratio-
nalize this focus on the local availability of service with the distinguishing
characteristics of services: As Oldenski (2009) documents, services are much
more dependent on face-to-face contact (“working with the public”) than,
say, manufacturing.
Ireland is singularly ﬁt for studying the questions that we are investigat-
ing.6 First, Ireland is a small, open economy with a trade to GDP ratio of
over 80 percent that is widely regarded as very well positioned entry point
into the European market. Ireland has attracted multiple well-known multi-
national corporations in electronics, pharmaceuticals and medical appliances
and more recently in services, some of which have chosen it as a base for
oﬀ-shoring.7 Moreover, in terms of services and service trade Ireland has
clearly excelled. In spite of its size, Ireland was, according to the OECD
(2009), in absolute terms about the world’s ninth largest exporter of services
in 2007. Second, Ireland wants to promote itself increasingly as an area that
is especially well-suited for supply chain management. As a matter of fact,
the Irish Development Agency (IDA) that tries to promote Ireland’s image
abroad explicitly links Ireland with supply chain management in its publi-
6Haider, Don (2005), Ireland: Celtic Tiger, Kellogg School of Management
KEL 141. Alfaro, Laura, Dev, Vinati and Stephen McIntyre (2008), Foreign
Direct Investment and Ireland’s Tiger Economy, Harvard Business School, 9-706-
007. See also, Enterprise Ireland’s Ireland Economic Proﬁle, http://www.enterprise-
ireland.com/SourceIreland/Ireland/Economy.htm
7Two very good references on the service discussion in Ireland
are: Catching the Wave. A service Strategy for Ireland, Report of




4cations.8 Moreover, the Irish success story has been built to a large extent
on sectors that should be especially conducive to supporting oﬀ-shoring in
goods: Ireland has an impressive IT sector, and has increasingly been able
to attract ﬁnancial, insurance, R&D and headquarter services.
Our empirical results are quite encouraging. We ﬁnd that both a greater
local availability of services and a higher labor productivity signiﬁcantly in-
crease a ﬁrm’s foreign sourcing of materials as a fraction of sales. Interest-
ingly, when we distinguish between local Irish ﬁrms, Irish multinationals and
Irish aﬃliates of foreign multinationals, we ﬁnd that the local availability of
service ﬁrms only seems to matter for the local Irish ﬁr m s ,n o tf o rt h em u l t i -
nationals. This result is quite intuitive as it suggests that multinationals may
be importing or may have internalized to a larger extent the services upon
which they rely for their international transactions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we
lay out the model. Comparative static eﬀects are derived in Section 3. In
Section 4, we present the empirical model, and in Section 5 we describe the
dataset. The results of our estimation are reported in Section 6, Section 7
concludes, and the Appendix contains proofs.
2 The Model
In this section, we develop a simple model of material-input sourcing by ﬁrms
in the manufacturing sector. There is a continuum of manufacturing ﬁrms
selling their ﬁnished products in the domestic (Irish or European) market.
From the consumers’ point of view, these products are diﬀerentiated varieties.




























i denotes the quantity per capita bought from ﬁrm i,a n dy the
consumption of the numeraire good. Parameter β describes the degree of
substitutability between the diﬀerent varieties of manufactures. The degree
of product diﬀerentiation increases with β.I f β =0 , goods are perfectly





8For a discussion of supply chain management in Ireland, see Sweeney et al. (2008).
5Assuming that the demand for the numeraire is positive, the inverse per-
capita demand faced by each ﬁrm i is




Denoting by L the number of consumers and by N the mass of active ﬁrms,
the market demand faced by ﬁrm i can be expressed as a function of the






















and where Ω∗ is the set of active ﬁrms. Firms are monopolistically competi-
tive. That is, they take N and ¯ p as given when deciding on prices. In what
follows, we will drop ﬁrm subscripts whenever possible.
Labor, the only factor of production, is inelastically supplied and perfectly
mobile across sectors. Since the numeraire good is produced by a competitive
industry under constant returns and a unit labor requirement of one, the price
of labor in the economy is equal to one. All costs can therefore be expressed
in terms of labor requirements.
Finished goods are produced using labor (l)a n dac o m p o s i t em a t e r i a l
input (x) according to the Leontief technology q =m i n {l/c,x},w h e r e1/c
represents labor productivity.9 The composite material input (x)c o m b i n e s







with 0 <φ<1. Domestic and imported materials are hence imperfect
substitutes with an elasticity of substitution equal to θ =1 /(1 − φ).F o r
simplicity we assume that both z and m are produced using one unit of
labor per unit of output, which is tantamount to having prices of z and m
equal to one.
9The assumption that labor and materials are complements is made for analytical
convenience. Our results would go through even if labor and materials were substitutes,
provided that the elasticity of substitution is not too big.
6Firms ﬁrst decide whether to enter the market and thus whether to incur
the sunk cost FE.U p o ne n t e r i n g ,e a c hﬁrm learns its labor productivity 1/c.
We assume that 1/c follows a Pareto distribution, which implies the following








where k ≥ 1.
Then follows the decision on what price to charge and how to procure
materials. Sourcing materials from abroad requires services, such as trans-
portation, trade ﬁnancing, business services like insurance and accounting,
and the more process-oriented supply-chain services. There are two ways
of obtaining these services. First, a ﬁrm may buy them from local service
providers; we refer to this as mode D. We assume that the margin paid to
local service ﬁrms is δ − 1 per unit of imported materials with δ>1.S i n c e
imported materials trade at a price of unity, the gross price of imported ma-
terials in mode D (including the service margin) is δ.10 Second, the ﬁrm may
obtain the services necessary for importing materials without going through
the local service market. That is, it may internalize the provision of services,
or import services from abroad. This is mode I.M o d e I involves a ﬁxed
cost, FI, associated with operating an own service department, or with iden-
tifying and communicating with foreign service providers. But by incurring
this ﬁxed cost, the margin on service purchases is reduced below δ − 1;f o r
simplicity, we normalize this margin to zero so that imported materials in
mode I carry a gross unit price of one. Mode D is hence associated with a
higher variable cost than mode I.At r a d e - o ﬀ occurs in the choice of mode
because mode I involves a ﬁxed cost.
Cost minimization by a manufacturer implies the following conditional
















10In the empirical section, we use a measure of local services availability to proxy for
the service margin δ − 1. The idea is that a greater availability of local services leads to
lower service prices and greater service variety, which implicitly reduces the cost of using
local service providers.












and ∆I ≡ (2)
φ−1
φ represent the variable costs of
materials under the two modes, and ∆D > ∆I.
A ﬁrm that uses mode j = D,I then sets its price to maximize




γN+β −∆D,w ec a nu s e( 3 )t os h o wt h a tt h ep r i c ee l a s t i c i t y








cD + ∆D − p
. (10)
The proﬁt-maximizing price of a ﬁrm with marginal labor cost c choosing










(cD + c + ∆D + ∆I). (12)










(cD − c + ∆D − ∆I), (14)











(cD − c + ∆D − ∆I)
2 − FE − FI. (16)
Since the entry cost is sunk, only ﬁrms able to cover their marginal labor
and material costs and, in case of mode I,t h eﬁxed cost FI are active in the
8market. All other ﬁrms are inactive, i.e., do not produce any output. (13)
indicates that the critical value of the marginal labor cost at which a ﬁrm
that has chosen mode D is indiﬀerent between being active and becoming
inactive is cD.O n l y m o d e - D ﬁrms with marginal labor costs less than cD
produce positive output. A ﬁrm that has chosen mode I has a lower marginal
cost of materials than a mode-D ﬁrm, as ∆D > ∆I. Hence, as indicated by
(14), such a ﬁrm would produce positive output if it had a marginal labor
cost equal to cD.
A comparison of (15) and (16) conﬁrms that mode I yields a higher
variable proﬁtt h a nm o d eD, but also requires an additional ﬁxed outlay
of FI.M o d e I is hence only attractive to ﬁrms whose output, and hence
variable proﬁt, is suﬃciently big to allow them to oﬀset FI. These are the
ﬁrms that have drawn a suﬃciently high labor productivity, 1/c.B ye q u a t i n g
πD(c) and πI(c),w ec a nd e r i v et h ec r i t i c a lv a l ue of the marginal labor cost,
denoted by cI,a tw h i c haﬁrm is indiﬀerent between modes D and I:







I no r d e rt om a k es u r et h a tn o ta l le n t r a n t sp r e f e rm o d eI to mode D we have
to assume that FI is suﬃciently large. On the other hand, we do not want
FI to be too large so that not even the most eﬃcient ﬁrm (with c =0 )w o u l d









2 +2 cD(∆D − ∆I)
¢
. (18)
This assumption, together with the quadratic form of the proﬁt functions,
ensures that the value of cI solving (17) is unique and lies strictly between
zero and cD. The two cut-oﬀ values of the marginal cost, cD and cI,t h u s
deﬁne three categories of ﬁrms. Firms whose labor productivity is suﬃciently
high (c ≤ cI)c h o o s em o d eI; ﬁrms whose labor productivity is in the middle
range (cI <c≤ cD)o p tf o rm o d e - D;a n dﬁrms with very low labor produc-
tivity (c>c D) are inactive because they are not able to cover their marginal
costs.
Finally, in equilibrium the mass of entrants has to be large enough so












9In the next section we explore the equilibrium of the model, focusing on those
c o m p a r a t i v es t a t i ce ﬀects that allow us to formulate testable hypotheses.
3 Comparative Statics
We are interested in understanding the variation in international sourcing
across ﬁrms, and, in particular, how this variation is related to diﬀerences
in local services availability (and thus the size of local service margins) and
in the ﬁrms’ labor productivity. The variables we observe at the ﬁrm level
include the spending by a ﬁrm on domestic materials (z), the spending on
imported materials (m), and the value of the ﬁrm’s sales (pq). We can thus
investigate directly how, in equilibrium, the ratio of imported materials to
sales (m/(pq)) changes with δ as well as with the ﬁrm’s labor productivity,
1/c; a formal proof of the results is relegated to the Appendix.
Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of a marginal change in δ.Am o d e - D ﬁrm’s ratio













2 (cD + c)
. (20)
The numerator of (20) corresponds to mD/qD, and it is easily veriﬁed that
d(mD/qD)/dδ < 0,a sa ni n c r e a s ei nδ leads to a substitution of domestic ma-
terials, z, for imported materials, m. The denominator of (20) represents pD.
A marginal increase in δ raises pD in two ways, namely by raising the mar-
ginal cost of materials, ∆D, and by lowering the price elasticity of demand,
η.T h ee ﬀect on η works through changes in cD and ∆D, as can be seen in
(10). First, a higher δ implies a lower cD,w h i c hb o o s t sη.T h er e a s o nw h y
an increase in δ decreases cD is that it lowers the proﬁts of mode-D ﬁrms,
thus forcing the least eﬃcient mode-D ﬁrms to become inactive. Second, a
rise in δ increases ∆D, which reduces η.T h i s s e c o n d e ﬀect dominates the
ﬁrst so that dη/dδ < 0.




0. Thus, a marginal increase in the cost of local services reduces material
imports of mode-D ﬁrms relative to their sales.







2 (cD + c + ∆D + ∆I)
. (21)
10Obviously the numerator, mI/qI, does not depend on δ.B u t a r i s e i n δ
aﬀects mode-I ﬁrms indirectly, since, as shown above, it decreases the price




)/dδ < 0, so that a marginal increase in the cost of local services
also implies a smaller ratio of imported materials to sales for mode-I ﬁrms.11
Mode-I ﬁrms should, of course, be less aﬀected by changes in δ than mode-D
ﬁrms, because their cost of material imports is independent of δ, and because
the price response of mode-I ﬁr m si ss m a l l e r :dpI/dδ < dpD/dδ. After all,
mode-I ﬁrms only raise prices in reaction to the decrease in the demand
elasticity, whereas mode-D ﬁrms also raise prices because they experience an




to react less to a change in δ than mD/
¡
pDqD¢
is for δ to be
suﬃciently close to 1.
Next, consider how the ratio of imported materials to sales depends on
labor productivity, 1/c.S i n c e mI/qI >m D/qD and pI <p D,i th a st ob e






. Given that mode-I ﬁrms have
strictly greater labor productivity than mode-D ﬁrms, it follows directly
that ﬁrms with a higher labor productivity import more materials relative to
sales than ﬁrms with low labor productivity. This prediction can be reﬁned
still further, since, even within each mode, ﬁrms with lower labor produc-




)/dc < 0 and d(mI/
¡
pIqI¢
)/dc < 0. Hence the ratio of mate-
rial imports to sales unambiguously rises with the ﬁrm’s labor productivity.
These results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 (i) A higher cost of local services lowers the ratio of imported
materials to sales for low-productivity (mode-D) ﬁrms, and only indirectly for
high-productivity (mode-I) ﬁrms; (ii) the ratio of imported materials to sales
is increasing in a ﬁrm’s labor productivity.
Proof: see Appendix.
Proposition 1 suggests three empirically testable hypotheses. First, the
share of materials a ﬁrm sources from abroad relative to its sales depends
negatively on the price of services (that is, positively on the availability
11Note that this indirect eﬀect comes from the assumption that preferences are quasi-
linear. With CES preferences, as e.g. in Antras and Helpman (2004), prices and outputs
of mode-I ﬁrms would be a constant mark-up over their own marginal cost and hence
would not react to changes in δ.
11of local services). Second, this eﬀect should be more pronounced for low
productivity than high productivity ﬁrms. Third, we should observe that
ﬁrms with a higher labor productivity have a higher ratio of material imports
to sales. In the remainder of the paper, we investigate these empirical
implications of our model using data on Irish plants.
4E m p i r i c a l M o d e l
As pointed out in the previous section, we do not observe the cost of services,
δ, directly in our data. Instead, we use a measure of the availability of local
services as a proxy. The reasoning for this proxy is that a greater availability
of locally available services implies lower prices and greater service variety,
which implicitly reduces the cost of using local service providers.
Based on the theoretical ideas developed in the previous sections, we
estimate variants of the following empirical model:
ln(m/(pq))it =l n( services)jrtβ1 + Xitβ2 + dt + dj + dr +  it,
where m/(pq) is the ratio of imported materials over sales for manufacturing
plant i at time t,a n dservices is a vector of variables capturing the availabil-
ity of services in industry j and region r in which plant i operates.12 X is a
vector of control variables to account for heterogeneity at the plant, industry
and regional level. We also include a full set of time, three-digit industry
and region dummies (dt, dj, dr, respectively), while  it denotes the ﬁnal error
term.
In order to measure the availability of local services, we calculate for our
baseline estimation the number of services ﬁrms located in region r at time t.
This is a measure of the pool of service providers in the region in which plant i
is located and to which it has easy access in the domestic economy. Note that
this variable has no variation across the industry dimension for diﬀerent i’s, as
this represents the total availability of services for all ﬁrms in manufacturing
industries. Hence, the implicit assumption is that all manufacturing ﬁrms
in the region have access to, and use in the same intensity, the same pool
of services providers. In order to show that the lack of variation along the
12In order to avoid taking the log of zero, the variable is calculated as ln((m/pq)+1 ) .
The same goes for all other logged variables in the empirical model.
12industry dimension does not pose a problem for our econometric analysis,
we also calculate below an alternative measure that varies across industries,
based on input-output linkages between manufacturing and services sectors.
This alternative is described in more detail below.
In the baseline model, we include a number of control variables at the ﬁrm
level in order to be able to properly identify the eﬀect of services availability
on material imports. As such, we control for labor productivity (calculated
as total wage bill per employee), a variable highlighted in our theoretical
model.13 Furthermore, we include plant size (measured in terms of employ-
m e n t )a sw e l la sd u m m yv a r i a b l e sf o re x p o r t e r s ,f o r e i g nm u l t i n a t i o n a l s ,a n d
domestic multinationals in our sample. These variables control for aspects
of plant-level heterogeneity that have been highlighted in the recent theoret-
ical and empirical literature. In extensions to our baseline model below, we
also include further observable region-, time-, and industry-varying covari-
ates in addition to a battery of ﬁxed eﬀects in order to aid identiﬁcation of
the coeﬃcients on the services measures, and address endogeneity concerns.
Note that the inclusion of regional and industry dummies allows us to ad-
dress some concerns about endogeneity of services availability. For example,
ﬁrms may decide to locate in regions in which there are many ﬁrms in order
to beneﬁt from agglomeration economies. This would potentially introduce a
correlation between the services measures and the error term. In short panels
such as ours, where the location of ﬁrms does not change over time, it is a
reasonable assumption that we can proxy this unobserved part of the error
term using time-invariant regional dummies. To be on the safe side, we also
include a set of time-varying regional variables. A similar argument could be
made for unobserved eﬀects at the industry level. If certain industries use
services heavily, and if this is not fully captured by our time-varying industry
variables, then this may lead to an endogeneity problem. Since, in our data,
no ﬁrm switches industries, this is captured using the industry dummies.
In the ﬁrst instance, we estimate our baseline model using simple OLS,
allowing the error term to be clustered around plant identiﬁers. This esti-
mation technique allows us to utilize both the cross section as well as time
variation in our data. However, as a downside, it does not control adequately
for plant-speciﬁc time-invariant unobserved eﬀects. In order to control for
such eﬀects, we also estimate the model using a ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. This
13Unfortunately, we do not have capital stock or investment data, so we cannot estimate
production functions to calculate total factor productivity.
13has the additional advantage that the plant ﬁxed eﬀect also allows us to
control further for potential endogeneity problems in the empirical model.
If there are common factors at the plant level that drive the left- as well as
right-side variables in the model, these will be taken care of, as long as they
a r ea s s u m e dt ob et i m ei n v a r i a n t .
5 Description of the Data
We use recent plant-level data from the Republic of Ireland. These data are
collected by Forfás, the Irish policy and advisory board with responsibility
for enterprise, trade, science, and technology. Speciﬁcally, our data source
is the Annual Business Survey of Economic Impact (ABSEI), covering the
period 2000 until 2004. This is an annual survey of plants with at least 10
employees, although a plant, once it is included, is generally still surveyed
even if its employment level falls below the 10 employee cut-oﬀ.T h es u r v e y
includes plants in manufacturing as well as services. In terms of services, the
focus is on internationally tradeable services; ﬁrms in other services industries
are neglected. For example, in 2004, out of 538 service-sector ﬁrms in the
total sample, roughly 82% are in NACE sectors 72 and 74 (computers and
business services, respectively), that are directly relevant for our analysis.
This dataset, quite uniquely, provides information at the plant level on
materials and services purchases, distinguishing imported and domestically
procured materials and services.14 Further data available from this source
that is relevant to the current paper are total sales, employment, exports,
nationality of ownership, three-digit sector of production, and region of lo-
cation. Within Ireland, a relatively small country, three regions are dis-
tinguished: Greater Dublin (the capital), South West & South East, and
Borders/Midlands/West (BMW). There is substantial heterogeneity in eco-
nomic development across these three regions, with most of economic activity
concentrated in Dublin; the South is also fairly well developed, while there is
less manufacturing industry in the BMW region. As indicated, our principal
measure of service availability is computed as the number of service-sector
ﬁr m si ne a c hr e g i o n ,w h i c hc h a n g e so v e rt i m e .
The information on nationality of ownership allows us to establish whether
ap l a n ti sa na ﬃliate of a foreign-owned multinational. This information is
14Unfortunately, however, we do not know what type of materials or service are pur-
chased.
14recorded as a binary variable indicating whether a plant is under majority
ownership of a foreign owner or not. The recent literature has highlighted
that identifying foreign multinationals is only one part of the picture. In or-
der to have a complete idea about the importance of multinationals, domestic
ﬁrms with aﬃliates abroad also need to be recognized. In 2000, Forfás, as
part of the ABSEI survey, also asked ﬁrms whether they had aﬃliates abroad.
We use this unique information and classify those domestic ﬁrms that have
aﬃliates abroad as domestic multinationals.15
In 2004, our sample contains 1,206 manufacturing plants. Of these, 343
are aﬃliates of foreign multinationals, 108 are domestic multinationals, 557
are domestic exporters, and 198 are domestic without exports or foreign
aﬃliates.
Table 1 describes the development of material imports over sales, and
the main measure of local services availability, on aggregate over the time
period covered in our sample. On average, Irish plants import intermediates
worth about 20 percent of sales, and there are about 150 services providers
in the average region. On aggregate, these ﬁgures have not changed much
over the ﬁve-year period. However, the aggregate ﬁgures hide substantial
heterogeneity across industries and plants, as indicated by the high standard
deviation.
Table 2 provides some evidence on regional variations in our main vari-
ables of interest in 2004. While ﬁrms have on average imported material
intensities of around 20%, there is variation across regions in this variable.
In particular, the import share is lowest in the Dublin region, which is the
region with the highest number of services ﬁrms. At the same time, it is the
smallest region in terms of manufacturing ﬁrms. In order to investigate the
link between imported materials and services at the ﬁrm level, it therefore
appears necessary to control for such diﬀerences in regional characteristics.
I nT a b l e3 ,w ed e p i c td i ﬀerences across industries. The ﬁrst columns
show means and standard deviations of the imported-materials-to-sales ratio
by two digit industry for the year 2004. The means range from 12 percent
(NACE 15–Food) to 27 percent (NACE 34–Transport Equipment). The
subsequent columns also show summary statistics for the number of services
ﬁrms in the region. Again, the statistics show diﬀerences across industries
15Girma et al. (2004) use this data to investigate productivity diﬀerentials between
domestic multinationals, exporters, and purely domestic ﬁrms. There are, to the best of
our knowledge, no other studies that have been able to identify domestic multinationals
in Ireland in large micro level data sets.
15and ﬁrms. For these summary statistics there is a negative raw pairwise
correlation between the ratio of imported materials to sales and the number
of services ﬁrms. However, the correlation coeﬃcients are not statistically
signiﬁcant. This suggests again that it is important to control for plant level
heterogeneity in order to uncover the relationship between material imports
and services availability at the plant level.
Table 4 shows that, as commonly found in the literature, plant-level het-
erogeneity matters for our analysis. The table reports coeﬃcients from simple
pooled OLS regressions of selected plant-level characteristics on dummies for
exporting status, foreign multinational, and domestic multinational indica-
tors. These regressions are estimated separately for the three regions. As
dependent variables, we employ the ratio of imported materials over sales,
employment size and labor productivity. The latter two are reported here
to link our paper to the large literature on ﬁrm level heterogeneity. Results
show that, as expected, there are premia to ﬁrm status. We ﬁnd the stan-
dard size and productivity premia for exporters and multinationals. More
related to our topic of interest, we also ﬁnd that multinationals, exporters
and, in one regression, domestic multinationals tend to import more materi-
als than domestic ﬁrms. The ﬁnding that exporters and multinationals have
higher material import ratios is consistent with our theoretical model, which
predicts that this ratio should be higher for high-productivity establishments.
6 Empirical Results
We now turn to the estimation of our empirical model described in Section 4.
Table 5 provides results for our baseline model, which includes time, region
and industry dummies and is estimated using OLS. Hence, this estimation
approach allows us to use the variation across establishments and time to
identify the eﬀect of services availability on the ratio of material imports to
sales. Column (1) presents the most basic version of the empirical model,
including the measure of the availability of services ﬁrms in the same region
as plant i. The results show that, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at
the industry and region level, greater services availability is associated with
a higher ratio of materials imports to sales by manufacturing establishments.
This is in line with our theoretical model, whereby services are needed to
facilitate the successful import of materials. While we also ﬁnd a positive co-
eﬃcient on labor productivity, as predicted by the model, this is statistically
16insigniﬁcant in the baseline speciﬁcation.
One aspect we need to take into account is the empirical importance
of multinationals also for the provision of services inputs. It could be the
case that our results not so much reﬂect the importance of the domestic
provision of services (i.e., by local ﬁrms) but just pick up the importance of
multinationals for linking up ﬁrms with suppliers abroad. Our data allow
us to look into this in more detail. We calculate our service availability
measures separately for domestic establishments and foreign multinationals
and include these as separate regressors in the model. The results, reported
in column (2), show that it is indeed the availability of domestic providers of
services, rather than just the presence of foreign multinational service ﬁrms,
that matters in the regression.
The results in columns (3) to (6) allow us to dig deeper into plant level
heterogeneity. We control for establishment status by including dummies for
foreign multinationals, domestic multinationals, and exporters. Furthermore,
we have run the regression separately for domestic multinationals, foreign
multinationals and domestic plants, and report the results in the respective
columns. This also links our analysis back to the theoretical model, which
shows that there are diﬀerences in the importance of local services availability
for mode-I and -D ﬁrms. Multinationals are more likely to internalize service
provision within their company structure, so are likely to be mode-I ﬁrms.
What is especially noteworthy in the results is that the availability of local
service providers matters only for domestic establishments. Domestic or for-
eign multinationals, by contrast, are not aﬀected by the thickness of services
at all. This is consistent with the theoretical model, assuming that multi-
nationals are more likely to be internalizers of services provision. Moreover,
this ﬁnding squares well with the observation in the data that of all manufac-
turing ﬁrms, multinationals import services most intensively.16 We also ﬁnd
that the coeﬃcient on productivity is still statistically insigniﬁcant for do-
mestic multinationals and purely domestic ﬁrms, but negative and signiﬁcant
for foreign multinationals. However, this result is diﬃcult to interpret, since
it may reﬂect other aspects of plant heterogeneity that are not controlled for.
It should also be kept in mind that the coeﬃcient on labor productivity is
conditional on other covariates. In particular, the model includes size, which
16Some fraction of the imported intermediates by multinationals will be intra-ﬁrm trade.
By deﬁnition, stand-alone ﬁrms are not involved in intra-ﬁrm trade. Our data do not allow
us to distinguish between intra-ﬁrm and arms’ length trade of multinationals. However,
anecdotal evidence suggest that intra-ﬁrm trade is signiﬁcant for services.
17is likely to be correlated with productivity (but does not feature in our theo-
retical model). Note that size consistently returns a positive coeﬃcient, i.e.,
larger plants have higher ratios of imported materials.
Overall, our baseline results are thus in line with the theoretical idea that
services are needed to "grease the wheels of commerce." In what follows we
check how robust our baseline results are to changes in the speciﬁcation of the
model. For instance, the availability of services may aﬀect not only imports
of materials but also exports of ﬁrms, which is a feature not captured by our
theoretical model. In order to take this empirical possibility into account,
we include only exporters in our regression sample. In Table 6 we replicate
the equivalent of Table 5 but only for exporters. As can be seen, the result
indicating the importance of services availability for domestic establishments
still holds.
One may, of course, be worried about endogeneity of our service avail-
ability measures, which may bias our results obtained thus far. We attempt
to deal with endogeneity in the further analysis. First, as pointed out above,
we argue that in a short panel plant ﬁxed eﬀects, which also capture time
invariant industry and regional characteristics, take care of this to a large
extent. Table 7 presents the results of ﬁxed eﬀects estimations. These show
that services availability matters in the same way as before. We also ﬁnd, as
alluded to above, that once we control for unobserved time-invariant plant-
speciﬁce ﬀects, the coeﬃcient on productivity turns positive and statistically
signiﬁcant for domestic ﬁrms, but remains statistically insigniﬁcant for multi-
nationals (domestic or foreign).
Another concern with our estimation thus far is that the services measure
is region-speciﬁc, and may therefore just pick up any region speciﬁct i m e -
varying characteristic. In order to alleviate this concern, we include further
time-varying variables at the region and industry level, which may capture
any potential correlation between our thickness measure and the error term.
At the regional level, we include the number of manufacturing ﬁrms (foreign
and domestic) as well as total sales in the region. The former is included
in order to address the possibility that the service availability measure just
captures general agglomeration eﬀects, which may inﬂuence ﬁrms’ sourcing
decisions. The second measure is included in order to capture the size of
a region. At the industry level, we control for the service intensity of the
industry (value of total services inputs over total sales in the industry) as
well as the intensity with which the industry uses locally sourced services
(value of locally sourced services over total services inputs). These measures
18allow us to control for heterogeneity in the use and sourcing of services inputs
in diﬀerent industries.
The results are reported in Table 8. Some points are particularly note-
worthy. First, the result that the availability of local services ﬁrms matters
for sourcing decisions of domestic establishments holds. Second, we now ﬁnd
that the availability of foreign multinational services ﬁrms aﬀects the sourc-
ing decisions of domestic multinationals positively. However, this eﬀect, as
shown below, is not robust to further changes to the model; hence, we do not
place much emphasis on it.
Before we deal further with any robustness checks, we come back to the
theoretical prediction of the model. One hypothesis from Proposition 1 that
we have not considered yet is that (low productivity) mode-D ﬁrms should
react more strongly to changes in the availability of services providers than
(high productivity) mode-I ﬁrms. In order to investigate this empirically, we
interact the service thickness variables with plant level labor productivity.
The results, estimated using a ﬁxed eﬀects technique, are presented in Table
9. Note that, for domestic establishments at least, results are in line with
our hypothesis. The coeﬃcient on the availability of local services remains
positive and statistically signiﬁcant, and the interaction of this variable is
negative, implying that the positive eﬀect of services availability is smaller
for ﬁrms with higher labor productivity. However, the coeﬃcient on the
interaction term is imprecisely estimated. The lack of statistical signiﬁcance
may reﬂect that we are asking too much of our service variable, which, as
discussed above, only varies over three regions and over time. Interacting
this with labor productivity generates a variable that is highly correlated
with productivity on its own; the exercise may ask too much of the data.
In order to alleviate this problem, we calculate an alternative service avail-
ability measure that also varies across industries. This, furthermore, allows
us to deal with a possible concern that the services measure employed just
picks up regional characteristics. In order to come up with the alternative,
we make use of the Irish input-output table for 2000 which allows us to trace
input links between two-digit manufacturing and services sectors. We calcu-
late what may be termed an "eﬀective availability" measure by multiplying
the number of services ﬁrms in a region and two digit service sector by the
input use coeﬃcient of the two digit service in manufacturing industry j,a n d
summing over region and industry j.T h ee x a c td e ﬁnition of this variable is
relegated to the Appendix.
Using this alternative measure and re-estimating the model used in Table
199 shows, in Table 10, similar results.17 For domestic establishments, we
ﬁnd that the availability of local services matters. The coeﬃcient on the
interaction term is negative as before, but not statistically signiﬁcant. Labor
productivity on its own is positively related to the ratio of material imports
to sales, as expected, and is statistically signiﬁcant. Furthermore, as before,
we do not ﬁnd any evidence that the availability of local services matters for
domestic or foreign multinationals in Ireland.
We now return to a discussion of endogeneity. Arguably, the inclusion of
plant ﬁxed eﬀects as well as of a number of time-varying ﬁrm, industry, and
regional variables is likely to be suﬃcient to alleviate such concerns, especially
in our short panel. Still, we proceed further and test whether, conditional
on the inclusion of all these covariates, the service availability measures are
likely to be endogenous in our empirical model. To do so, we re-estimate
the models presented in Table 10 using an IV estimator employing twice
lagged levels and diﬀerences of the variables as instruments. The estimations
are reported in Table 11. Note that the overidentiﬁcation tests suggest that
these are valid instruments, while the ﬁrst stage F-tests suggest strongly
t h a tt h e ya r ea l s or e l e v a n t .W h i l et h es i g n sa r et h es a m ea si nT a b l e s9a n d
10, there are diﬀerences in statistical signiﬁcance levels. For domestic ﬁrms,
we now ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant positive coeﬃcient on the interaction
term, as we would expect. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the availability of services
provided by multinationals matters for domestic ﬁrms. Furthermore, there
is now evidence that imports of materials by foreign multinationals react
to changes in the availability of locally provided services. However, note
that, importantly, the Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests do not allow us to reject
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of regressors. Hence, we prefer the FE
estimates presented in Table 10 to the IV estimates.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The paper examined whether services grease the wheels of international com-
merce in the sense that they facilitate the ongoing process of international
fragmentation of production that has received ample attention under the
heading of ‘outsourcing’ and ‘oﬀ-shoring’. Speciﬁcally we wanted to examine
what eﬀect services have on oﬀ-shoring at the micro-level. For this purpose,
17Note that, when estimating the model in Table 8, using the alternative measure we
also get similar results. These estimations are not reported here, however, to save space.
20we used ﬁrm-level data from the Republic of Ireland to investigate whether
the availability of local services induces manufacturing ﬁrms to source more
material inputs from abroad, and whether this eﬀect diﬀered across ﬁrms of
diﬀerent size or labor productivity and diﬀerent status as national or multi-
national ﬁrm.
To guide the empirics, we sketched a monopolistic competition model
with heterogeneous ﬁrms. In the model, ﬁrms source intermediate goods
both locally and internationally. Imports of materials require services that
can be obtained either from local third-party providers, or, alternatively, be
imported or produced by the ﬁrm itself. Our empirics generally bear out the
predictions of the model: (i) greater availability of services in the ﬁrm’s home
region leads to a higher ratio of imported materials to sales; and (ii) larger
or more productive ﬁrms in an industry have a greater material-imports-to-
sales ratio. Moreover, it turns out that the availability of services is especially
important for local Irish ﬁrms but not for multinationals, which suggests that
multinationals are able to internalize the provision of their services and/or
rely on imported services. The general conclusion of the paper hence is that
services indeed grease the wheels of international commerce.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The proof has four parts. First, we show that dcD/dδ < 0. Using the Pareto
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.W h e nk =1 , this inequality reduces
to (cD − cI)2 > 0.W h e nk>1, the RHS of the above inequality increases
faster than the LHS.
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qIpI,w h i c hi st h ec a s ei fδ is suﬃciently close to 1.
8.2 Deﬁnition of the Alternative Services Availability
Measure
To calculate the alternative services availability measure, we use our plant-
level information on the location and two-digit sector of services ﬁrms. Hence,
22we are able to calculate for each region r the number of services ﬁrms in
service sector s, ns. From the Irish input-output table for 2000, we use the
input coeﬃcients ajs, which give us the amount of inputs from service sector
s used in manufacturing industry j as percentage of output of industry j.









We scale this variable using the number of manufacturing ﬁrms in region
r, nm. This allows us to deal with another concern one may have with the
initial measure, namely, that it reﬂects characteristics related to the size of
manufacturing activity in the region.
Table A1 presents some summary statistics on the variation of the eﬀec-
tive availability measure within and across regions. Note that the absolute
value of the measure is intrinsically meaningless, what matters is the vari-
ation. We see that, as for the standard thickness measure, Dublin has the
highest values and BMW the lowest. Note, however, that now we also have
substantial variation within region in these measures, as indicated by the
standard deviation.
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25Table 1: Development of (Imported materials / Sales) and service availability measure over time 
 
Year  Imported 
materials / 
Sales 




  mean  Std.dev.  mean  Std.dev. 
2000  0.212  0.147  135.23  1.71 
2001  0.200  0.151  150.96  1.77 
2002  0.188  0.149  163.20  1.73 
2003  0.181  0.147  175.21  1.68 
2004  0.190  0.146  149.16  1.64 
 
Notes:  
•  Services firm availability is defined as number of services firms in region r at time t.   
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics across regions, 2004 
 
Region  Dublin  South West & East  Borders/Midlands/West 
       
Imported materials / 
Sales 
0.182  0.210  0.200 
  (0.172)  (0.178)  (0.169) 
# of Services firms  289  174  75 
       
#  of MNC services 
firms 
72  64  20 
       
# of Domestic services 
firms 
217  110  55 
       
# of manufacturing 
firms 
242  586  378 
 
Notes: 
•  Table reports means and standard deviations in parentheses. 
•  Imported materials / sales is defined as total value of imported materials over total value of sales.  
Table 3: Variation of (Imported materials / Sales) and service availability measure over sectors, year 2004 
 
 
NACE Description  Imported 
materials 
/ Sales 




  mean  Std.dev.  mean  Std.dev. 
Food & Beverages  0.119  0.128  151.11  1.69 
Tobacco  0.189  0.144  129.15  2.03 
Textiles  0.264  0.134  128.38  1.71 
Apparel   0.273  0.131  159.49  1.82 
Leather  0.221  0.126  123.72  1.82 
Wood products  0.152  0.140  115.12  1.65 
Pulp & paper  0.226  0.163  199.94  1.68 
Publishing & printing  0.143  0.135  222.29  1.69 
Coke & petrol  0.232  0.071  75.19  1.09 
Chemicals  0.238  0.142  184.56  1.64 
Rubber & plastic  0.243  0.151  135.10  1.71 
Non-metallic minerals  0.144  0.128  141.74  1.73 
Basic metals  0.203  0.182  161.42  1.59 
Fabricated metals  0.180  0.150  157.28  1.65 
Machinery  0.208  0.145  149.90  1.67 
Office machinery  0.230  0.184  170.89  1.78 
Electrical machinery  0.230  0.162  157.43  1.73 
Radio & communications  0.224  0.161  177.15  1.62 
Medical & optical instruments  0.203  0.133  145.33  1.68 
Vehicles  0.265  0.119  124.21  1.57 
Other transport equipment  0.258  0.136  215.94  1.60 
Other manufacturing  0.186  0.126  146.64  1.79 
 




Table 4: Premia for exporters, foreign multinationals and Irish multinationals 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
Region  Dublin  South  Border  Dublin  South  Border  Dublin  South  Border 




















0.044  0.051  0.078  0.995  1.053  0.854  0.300  0.260  0.238 
  (0.019)**  (0.012)***  (0.017)***  (0.176)***  (0.112)***  (0.120)***  (0.052)***  (0.033)***  (0.038)*** 
Domestic 
MNC dummy 
0.028  0.064  0.048  0.158  0.414  0.504  0.039  0.027  0.122 
  (0.017)*  (0.012)***  (0.015)***  (0.142)  (0.088)***  (0.101)***  (0.049)  (0.035)  (0.052)** 
Exporter 
dummy 
0.021  0.023  0.036  0.642  0.557  0.894  0.043  0.091  0.088 
  (0.020)  (0.015)  (0.018)*  (0.136)***  (0.142)***  (0.139)***  (0.049)  (0.041)**  (0.052)* 
Obs.  1137  2610  1731  1137  2610  1731  1137  2610  1731 
R-squared  0.29  0.25  0.28  0.38  0.35  0.32  0.36  0.28  0.27 
 
Simple OLS regression of dependent variable on foreign, domestic multinational and export dummies. Regression includes constant term, three digit industry and 
time dummies. 
Imports / sales is defined as total value of imported materials over total value of sales.  
Robust standard errors, clustered around plant identifier, in parentheses.         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
 
  
Table 5: Baseline model for all firms 
 
Dependent variable: ln(Imported materials / Sales) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  all  All  All  ODI  Foreign  Domestic 
Services firm 
availability 
0.129           
  (0.045)***           
Foreign MNC services 
firm availability 
  0.043  0.050  0.221  0.043  0.013 
    (0.043)  (0.042)  (0.152)  (0.080)  (0.053) 
Domestic services firm 
availability 
  0.087  0.084  0.082  0.026  0.085 
    (0.031)***  (0.031)***  (0.091)  (0.065)  (0.039)** 
Labor productivity  0.003  0.003  -0.018  -0.017  -0.049  -0.005 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)***  (0.031)  (0.018)***  (0.008) 
Dummy domestic MNC      0.020       
      (0.010)**       
Dummy foreign MNC      0.051       
      (0.009)***       
Dummy exporter      0.051  0.179  0.047  0.051 
      (0.008)***  (0.050)***  (0.032)  (0.009)*** 
Firm size      0.008  0.030  0.001  0.010 
      (0.003)***  (0.010)***  (0.006)  (0.004)*** 
Observations  5478  5478  5478  466  1527  3485 
R-squared  0.16  0.16  0.20  0.38  0.19  0.21 
Regressions with 3-digit industry and region dummies. 
Robust standard errors, clustered around firm identifier, in parentheses.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.           
Regressions include constant term. 
 
Services firm availability is defined as number of services firms in region r at time t.   
Foreign MNC services firm availability and domestic services firm availability are defined as number of foreign 
and domestic services firms in region r at time t, respectively.   
 
  
Table 6: Baseline model for exporters only 
 
Dependent variable: ln(Imported materials / Sales) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  All  ODI  Foreign  Domestic 
Services firm 
availability 
       
         
Foreign MNC services 
firm availability 
0.056  0.239  0.050  0.019 
  (0.047)  (0.152)  (0.082)  (0.065) 
Domestic services firm 
availability 
0.092  0.090  0.031  0.103 
  (0.036)**  (0.092)  (0.070)  (0.049)** 
Labor productivity  -0.025  -0.018  -0.048  -0.009 
  (0.009)***  (0.032)  (0.018)***  (0.010) 
Dummy domestic MNC  0.025       
  (0.011)**       
Dummy foreign MNC  0.051       
  (0.010)***       
Firm size  0.009  0.033  0.002  0.010 
  (0.003)**  (0.010)***  (0.006)  (0.004)** 
Observations  4496  454  1469  2573 
R-squared  0.19  0.37  0.18  0.22 
Regressions with 3-digit industry and region dummies. 
Robust standard errors, clustered around firm identifier, in parentheses.          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.           
Regressions include constant term. 
 
For definition of service availability measures see Table 5. 
  
Table 7: Baseline model with firm fixed effects for exporters only 
 
Dependent variable: ln(Imported materials / Sales) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ODI  Foreign  Domestic 
Foreign MNC services 
firm availability 
0.254  -0.078  0.010 
  (0.102)**  (0.054)  (0.039) 
Domestic services firm 
availability 
0.026  -0.009  0.093 
  (0.065)  (0.040)  (0.028)*** 
Labor productivity  -0.020  0.010  0.016 
  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.008)* 
Firm size  -0.039  0.037  0.012 
  (0.025)  (0.010)***  (0.007)* 
Observations  454  1469  2573 
# of firms  205  482  966 
R-squared  0.06  0.03  0.02 
Regressions with firm fixed effects. 
R-squared for regression on within transformed variables, any impact of time invariant explanatory variables is purged. 
Standard errors in parentheses.           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.           
Regressions include constant term. 
 
For definition of availability measures see Table 5. 
  
Table 8: Extended model with additional covariates, for exporters only 
 
Dependent variable: ln(Imported materials / Sales) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ODI  Foreign  Domestic 
Foreign MNC services firm availability  0.241  -0.088  0.009 
  (0.106)**  (0.060)  (0.042) 
Domestic services firm availability  0.098  -0.024  0.103 
  (0.080)  (0.045)  (0.033)*** 
Labor productivity  -0.025  0.016  0.017 
  (0.022)  (0.013)  (0.008)** 
Firm size  -0.033  0.039  0.013 
  (0.025)  (0.010)***  (0.007)* 
Industry total services intensity  -0.016  0.005  -0.001 
  (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Industry local services intensity  0.164  -0.143  -0.028 
  (0.088)*  (0.042)***  (0.040) 
# of foreign MNC manufacturing firms in 
region 
-0.027  0.003  -0.000 
  (0.034)  (0.021)  (0.013) 
# of domestic manufacturing firms in 
region 
-0.006  0.011  -0.017 
  (0.045)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
region size  0.064  -0.006  0.007 
  (0.048)  (0.028)  (0.019) 
Observations  454  1469  2573 
# of firms  205  482  966 
R-squared  0.10  0.05  0.02 
Regressions with firm fixed effects. 
R-squared for regression on within transformed variables, any impact of time invariant explanatory variables is purged. 
Standard errors in parentheses.           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.           
Regressions include constant term. 
 
For definition of availability measures see Table 5. 
 Table 9: Interaction of availability and productivity 
 
Dependent variable: ln(Imported materials / Sales) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ODI  Foreign  Domestic 
Foreign MNC services firm availability  0.270  0.009  0.062 
  (0.259)  (0.137)  (0.087) 
Domestic services firm availability  0.218  -0.182  0.147 
  (0.182)  (0.117)  (0.065)** 
Foreign MNC services firm availability x 
productivity 
-0.013  -0.029  -0.013 
  (0.064)  (0.034)  (0.022) 
Domestic services firm availability x 
productivity 
-0.037  0.046  -0.015 
  (0.052)  (0.032)  (0.019) 
Labor productivity  0.186  -0.080  0.140 
  (0.147)  (0.105)  (0.062)** 
Firm size  -0.046  0.039  0.011 
  (0.027)*  (0.010)***  (0.007) 
Industry total services intensity  -0.012  0.005  -0.001 
  (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Industry local services intensity  0.174  -0.141  -0.029 
  (0.089)*  (0.042)***  (0.040) 
# of foreign MNC manufacturing firms in 
region 
-0.025  0.002  0.001 
  (0.034)  (0.021)  (0.013) 
# of domestic manufacturing firms in 
region 
-0.007  0.011  -0.017 
  (0.045)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
region size  0.082  -0.014  0.016 
  (0.049)*  (0.029)  (0.020) 
Observations  454  1469  2573 
# of firms  205  482  966 
R-squared  0.11  0.05  0.02 
Regressions with firm fixed effects. 
R-squared for regression on within transformed variables, any impact of time invariant explanatory variables is purged. 
Standard errors in parentheses.           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.           
Regressions include constant term; for definition of availability measures see Table 5. Table 10: Interaction of availability and productivity with alternative availability measure 
 
Dependent variable: ln(Imported materials / Sales) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ODI  Foreign  Domestic 
Foreign MNC services firm availability  0.005  0.002  -0.001 
  (0.013)  (0.004)  (0.003) 
Domestic services firm availability  -0.002  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)* 
Foreign MNC services firm availability x 
productivity 
-0.002  -0.001  0.000 
  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Domestic services firm availability x 
productivity 
0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Labor productivity  -0.022  0.016  0.025 
  (0.027)  (0.015)  (0.010)** 
Firm size  -0.025  0.039  0.012 
  (0.026)  (0.010)***  (0.007)* 
Industry total services intensity  -0.022  0.005  -0.000 
  (0.022)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Industry local services intensity  0.134  -0.152  -0.028 
  (0.089)  (0.042)***  (0.040) 
# of foreign MNC manufacturing firms in 
region 
-0.019  0.003  0.005 
  (0.033)  (0.021)  (0.013) 
# of domestic manufacturing firms in 
region 
0.015  -0.002  -0.009 
  (0.046)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
region size  0.068  -0.030  -0.029 
  (0.038)*  (0.021)  (0.014)** 
Observations  454  1469  2573 
# of firms  205  482  966 
R-squared  0.08  0.05  0.02 
Regressions with firm fixed effects. 
R-squared for regression on within transformed variables, any impact of time invariant explanatory variables is purged. 
Standard errors in parentheses.           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.           
Regressions include constant term. 
 
For definition of alternative availability measures see appendix. 
 
 Table 11: Instrumental variables estimation with alternative availability measure 
 
Dependent variable: ln(Imported materials / Sales) 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  ODI  Foreign  Domestic 
Foreign MNC services firm availability  0.111  0.031  -0.050 
  (0.096)  (0.013)**  (0.018)*** 
Domestic services firm availability  -0.027  -0.008  0.014 
  (0.028)  (0.003)**  (0.005)*** 
Foreign MNC services firm availability x 
productivity 
-0.029  -0.008  0.014 
  (0.028)  (0.003)**  (0.005)*** 
Domestic services firm availability x 
productivity 
0.008  0.002  -0.004 
  (0.008)  (0.001)**  (0.001)*** 
Labor productivity  -0.027  -0.047  -0.012 
  (0.042)  (0.027)*  (0.019) 
Firm size  0.017  0.002  0.016 
  (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.005)*** 
Industry total services intensity  -0.028  0.032  0.009 
  (0.071)  (0.039)  (0.036) 
Industry local services intensity  0.043  -0.157  -0.002 
  (0.280)  (0.240)  (0.157) 
# of foreign MNC manufacturing firms in 
region 
-0.106  0.029  -0.019 
  (0.033)***  (0.028)  (0.016) 
# of domestic manufacturing firms in 
region 
-0.093  0.039  0.006 
  (0.039)**  (0.030)  (0.017) 
region size  0.181  -0.162  -0.054 
  (0.217)  (0.133)  (0.101) 
Observations  179  557  843 
Sargan (p-value)  0.54  0.29  0.75 
First stage F test (Foreign MNC services 
firm availability) 
75.13  280.58  446.95 
First stage F test (Domestic services firm 
availability) 
77.93  268.53  349.91 
First stage F test (Foreign MNC services 
firm availability x productivity) 
12.26  191.25  234.97 
First stage F test (Domestic services firm 
availability x productivity) 
12.93  190.83  217.13 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman (p-value)  0.55  0.53  0.53 
IV regressions.  Services firm availability and interactions are endogenous variables.  Instruments are twice lagged 
levels and differences of endogenous variables 
Standard errors in parentheses.           
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.           
Regressions include constant term. 
 
For definition of alternative availability measures see appendix. 
  
Table A1: Summary statistics for alternative services availability measure across regions, 2004 
 
Region  Dublin  South West & East  Borders/Midlands/West 
       
Effective # of MNC 
services firms 
28.05  6.99  6.87 
  (23.79)  (7.48)  (8.34) 
Effective # of Domestic 
services firms 
96.76  34.73  8.29 
  (81.32)  (38.26)  (10.71) 
 
Notes: 
•  Table reports means and standard deviations in parentheses. 
•  For definition of alternative measure see appendix. 
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